ABSTRACT In the user selection phase of mobile crowdsensing, most existing incentive mechanisms focus on either single-attribute selection or random selection, which possibly lead to serious consequences such as low user enthusiasm, decreased task completion rate, and increased cost of platform consumption. To tackle these issues, in this paper, we propose a novel incentive mechanism MAIM, which is based on multi-attribute user selection and participation intention analysis function in mobile crowdsensing. In this mechanism, the sensing platform employs the analytic hierarchy process to determine the weights of three attributes: participation threshold, cost, and reputation. The weight calculation results of each sensing user with respect to each attribute are then integrated to obtain the sorted weight of each user, with which the sensing platform will then obtain the optimal user set. From the users' perspective, they can autonomously decide whether to accept task processing requests, as enabled by the participation intention analysis function, thereby voiding the absolute authority and control of the sensing platform over users and achieving a two-way selection between the sensing platform and the sensing users. Furthermore, the sensing platform establishes a score-based reputation reward to inspire active performers and utilizes a punishment mechanism to overawe malicious vandals, which substantially helps activize enthusiasm of user participation and improve sensing data quality. Simulation results indicate that the proposed MAIM has significantly improved the sensing task completion ratio and the budget surplus ratio compared with the existing incentive mechanisms in mobile crowdsensing.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the popularity and widespread use of various mobile portable sensing devices, such as smartphones, tablets, wearable devices among others, a novel integrated mode of sensing environment is enabled for data collection, data clustering [1] and information services, which are essential for realizing deep ubiquitous social sensing, namely mobile crowdsensing [2] , [3] . The recent emergence of extensive applications based on sensing has promoted the rapid development of mobile crowdsensing networks [4] , [5] . Compared to traditional sensor networks deployed with fixed sensors [6] , mobile crowdsensing networks have three main advantages: wide sensing range, low cost and simple maintenance [7] . Therefore, they are more competent for completing large scale and highly mobile sensing tasks. Mobile crowdsensing networks have recently been widely used in environmental monitoring [8] , traffic monitoring [9] , social behavior analysis [10] , multimedia data processing [11] , keyword search [12] and many other fields. In many mobile crowdsensing applications, sensing user participation is the key factor to determine whether high-quality data can be obtained. The resource consumption in the sensing process may have a direct negative impact on the enthusiasm of sensing user participation and the quality of sensing data [13] , [14] . For example, uploading sensing data generates a large amount of communication traffic and consumes sensing device's power, which results in sensing users unwilling to participate in sensing tasks without proper compensation or incentive. In order to encourage user participation in the sensing process, a rational and practical incentive mechanism is demanded to compensate the user's consumption.
At present, the research results on the incentive mechanism of mobile crowdsensing can be divided into money-based incentives and non-money-based incentives according to different incentive methods [7] . Non-money incentives mainly include entertainment game incentive [15] , social attribute aware incentive [16] , and reputation score incentive [17] . Specifically, non-money incentives motivate sensing users to participate in sensing tasks by providing users with external virtual material and psychological requirements. However, due to the limitations of the application scenarios and the virtuality of the reward methods, the user participation is typically not high. Money-based incentives are mainly to encourage the participation of the sensing users through the reward payments. The main design idea is based on the game theory of auction mechanisms, including reverse auction, combined auction [18] , multi-attribute auction, full payment auction, and two-way auction [7] , [19] . Reward payment incentives exchange the user's sensing data in form of money, which not only expands the scope of application but also improves the user's sense of acquisition. Therefore, money-based incentives are often more likely to stimulate the interest of users in participation than non-monetary incentives. The incentive mechanisms based on payment can further be divided into platform-centered incentive mechanisms and user-centered incentive mechanisms according to whether the user participates in the quotation [20] . In platform-centered incentive mechanisms, there is no user quotation process, and such mechanisms mainly focus on how to select users and what reward payment decisions to use under the budget constraints to maximize platform utility. In this case, the platform has the absolute control to maximize its own utility under budget constraints, which may however lead to user passiveness and subsequently declining participation. In user-centered incentive mechanisms, a user quotation process mechanism exists mainly focusing on how to determine the user winner and what reward payment decisions to take in order to minimize platform cost and maximize platform utility. As a comparison, the sensing platform no longer masters the absolute control and the user's interests are given priority to consider. In this situation, user quality issues, task coverage issues, and data quality issues have become major concerns for the crowdsensing system. Both the platform-centered incentives and the user-centered incentives focus on the platform's user selection. However, most of the incentive mechanisms adopt single attribute selection or random selection, which may lead to the problems such as declined user enthusiasm, decreased task completion rate, and increased cost of platform consumption.
In summary, both money-based and non-money incentives are single incentive approaches and each has its own strengths and weaknesses. Designing and constructing an effective hybrid incentive mechanism has research significance to ensure that a sufficient number of sensing users provide highquality data to participate in sensing tasks for an extended period of time. This paper combines money-based incentives with non-money incentives and proposes a novel incentive mechanism MAIM, which is based on multi-attribute user selection, and includes reward payment incentive and reputation score incentive. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• In terms of user selection, the sensing platform performs user screening twice. The primary user screening is performed based on user reputation score, and the secondary user screening uses analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Based on the three attributes, namely user participation threshold, cost and reputation value, the sensing platform performs secondary user screening by employing AHP method to determine the optimal user set.
• The proposed method provides a participation intention analysis function for sensing users. Comparing the calculation results of the cost function and the reward function with the participation threshold, MAIM obtains the participation intention value of the sensing user participating in the sensing task, and thereby realizes the two-way selection between the sensing platform and the users.
• The sensing platform establishes the reputation score reward and punishment mechanism by utilizing the corresponding algorithms, and adopts different reputation score updating methods according to different existence states and performances of sensing users. Rewarding active performers and punishing malicious vandals, MAIM can greatly motivate sensing users and improve the quality of the sensing data.
• Through the feasibility verification analysis, the proposed MAIM method is proved valid and feasible. Simulation results show that MAIM has significantly improved the task completion ratio and budget surplus ratio.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the problem description is given in Section II, and an elaborate construction of MAIM is presented in Section III. In Section IV, the feasibility is verified and the performances of MAIM is evaluated. After reviewing the related work in Section V, we conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In order to improve the enthusiasm of users to participate in sensing tasks and enhance the quality of sensing VOLUME 6, 2018 data submitted by users in mobile crowdsensing, this paper proposes an incentive mechanism MAIM based on multiattribute user selection. The sensing platform makes use of analytic hierarchy process (AHP) [21] to perform multiattribute user selection and pays the users rewards under the budget limit, thereby reducing the platform consumption cost and maximizing the platform utility. In addition, the sensing users can decide whether to accept the sensing task processing request according to the participation intention analysis. Sensing users who participate in task processing can not only obtain sensing rewards but also enjoy with reputation score, which is beneficial to improve user participation enthusiasm and user quality level, thereby increasing the task completion ratio. To facilitate the description of MAIM incentive mechanism, Table 1 lists frequently used symbols and corresponding descriptions. The system model of MAIM considers a typical mobile crowdsensing architecture, including service provider participating in final data transactions, sensing platform, and a large number of sensing users participating in sensing tasks, as shown in Figure 1 .
A. SENSING USERS
Sensing users are ordinary users who use mobile intelligent terminals such as smartphones, tablets, smart wearable devices, and interact with the sensing platform through wireless/wired networks. Sensing users participate in sensing tasks, upload the three attributes of participation threshold, cost and reputation value and sensing data to the sensing platform, attempting to maximize their rewards.
B. SENSING PLATFORM
Sensing platform: The sensing platform interacts with the service provider and sensing users. It can be hosted on a fog node [22] , in a mobile cloud, or on an edge computing node [23] . On one hand, sensing platform publishes sensing tasks, collects attributes information of sensing users to find the optimal user set, and gathers the sensing data uploaded by sensing users. On the other hand, the sensing platform trades data with the service provider and obtains sensing rewards.
C. SERVICE PROVIDER
The service provider purchases and analyzes sensing data from the sensing platform using machine learning, data mining and other methods, and provides the requesters with various types of application services. The service provider aims to maximize platform utility and purchases reliable sensing data at reasonable prices.
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH: MAIM
In this section, we give an outline of the proposed approach, and further elaborate the construction of the incentive mechanism.
A. OUTLINE OF MAIM
The outline of the proposed MAIM is shown in Figure 2 , which contains the following nine steps.
(1) Before publishing the sensing tasks, the sensing platform divides the tasks into multiple subtasks, and sets a subtask utility value for each subtask. Meanwhile, the sensing platform sets the reputation score threshold and the initial reputation score for each sensing user.
(2) The sensing platform publishes the subtasks to sensing users in the area in an open and rotating manner.
(3) After receiving a subtask message, the sensing users generates a random participation threshold, the cost of completing the subtask and the reputation value, and then uploads these three attributes to the sensing platform.
(4) The sensing platform performs primary user screening based on the user's reputation score and the reputation score threshold. It is worth noting that the reputation score of the sensing users changes according to the assignment and completion of task processing.
(5) Following the primary user screening, the sensing platform makes use of AHP to perform secondary user screening based on the three attribute information uploaded by the sensing users thereby determining the optimal user set.
(6) The sensing platform calculates the reward to be received by the sensing users participating in the task processing according to the reward calculation function. Such calculation considers the surplus of the total budget, the utility value of the subtask to be executed, and the total number of subtasks currently completed. Reward is then sent to the sensing users according to calculation results.
(7) Upon receiving the optimal user set and reward from the sensing platform, the sensing user can decide whether to accept the processing request of the subtask with the help from the participation intention analysis function. If the ratio of the obtained reward to the cost of processing the subtask is greater than its own participation threshold, the sensing user accepts the processing request of the subtask, otherwise the request is rejected.
(8) The sensing platform adopts different reputation score updating methods according to the different existence states and performances of the sensing users, and those who have updated the credit score can participate in the next task competition. In particular, the sensing users with high reputation score will have an advantage in the primary user screening.
(9) Repeating steps (2) to (8) till all subtasks have been processed or the total platform budget has been exhausted.
B. CONSTRUCTION OF MAIM
Assume that the sensing platform is P, the sensing user set is U , and the task set is T , where the task set T contains multiple subtasks. The sensing platform publishes subtasks in turn: as long as a subtask is not executed, the platform will publish the subtask request message to sensing users. Upon receiving the message, user U i can determine whether to participate in the sensing task, and the participant will obtain the sensing reward and the reputation score. This process will be repeated till task set T becomes empty or total platform budget B is exhausted. The incentive mechanism of MAIM will be elaborated in the following subsections.
1) TASK PUBLISH PHASE
Before P publishes a task, T needs to be divided into several subtasks k, where k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K }. A utility value is set for each subtask using the formula shown in formula (1) .
It is assumed that all task types are in line with the utility value proportional to the task size. P publishes subtasks to the sensing users moving in a certain area in an open and rotating manner. In addition, P sets the reputation score threshold δ and assigns each sensing user U i an initial reputation score q. As the sensing user participates in task processing process, the reputation score qt of the sensing user will be updated. This score will be an important factor for user selection, and the reputation score threshold will be used for evaluating the reputation score.
2) TASK RESPONSE PHASE
Upon receiving the subtask message published by P, user U i enters the task response phase. U i uploads the three attributes: the participation threshold thresh i , the reputation value Q i and the cost C i to the sensing platform P. The three user attributes will be used as influence attributes to affect the sensing platform for user selection. More details about thresh i , Q i and C i will be described as follows.
(1) Participation threshold thresh i : the participation threshold is generated randomly each time and is not disclosed to other users.
(2) Reputation value Q i : according to the reputation calculation model established by Nan et al. [13] , this paper uses the utility value of historical task completion by sensing user U i to calculate reputation value. The time decay factor is defined representing the influence weight of the historical completion task on the reputation value. The reputation value is affected by the utility value of the historical completion task. As time goes by, the utility value of an early completed task has a slight impact on the reputation value, while the utility value of a recently completed task will affect the calculation of the next reputation value to a greater extent. This paper considers the dynamic change of the reputation value of the sensing user over time to accurately reflect the reputation value of the sensing user in real time. The time window is used to calculate the time decay factor, and the time for U i to perform the task is divided into multiple time windows with the time interval of each time window being θ . The time period during which U i processes the task the earliest is called the first time window TW 1 , and the exponential function e TW tm −TW h 2 is expressed as a time decay factor. Specifically, the characteristics of the time decay factor are that the utility value of the completed task closer to the current time has a greater influence on the reputation value of the sensing user, while the utility value of the completed task farther from the current time has less influence on the reputation value of the sensing user. Assume that the time window in which U i is currently located is TW h , and d tm is the number of tasks that the sensing user is performing in the tmth time window. The formula for calculating the reputation value Q i (TW h ) of the sensing user U i in the time window TW h is as shown in formula (2) . The utility value of the completed task determines the reputation value of the sensing user U i according to the law of time decay.
The reputation value of the sensing user U i is updated upon completing the participation of each sensing task, and the real-time reputation value calculation ensures the reliability of the data quality to a certain extent.
(3) Cost C i : sensing user U i consumes the corresponding resources when participating in a sensing task thereby resulting in a cost. For a subtask, this paper uses
The function indicates that the sensing cost of user U i is proportional to the size g k of the subtask k and inversely proportional to the reputation value Q i . The calculation formula is shown in formula (3), where α (0 < α < 1) and β (0 < β < 1) are two random factors, and α + β = 1.
3) USER SELECTION PHASE
In order to improve the user quality level, the platform filters the sensing users participating in the task response. The platform first performs the primary user screening based on the user's reputation score q t . If q t is greater than the reputation score threshold δ set by the platform, the user will be preferentially selected as a candidate. Based on the primary user screening, the platform performs secondary screening using AHP [21] to obtain the optimal user set. The specific steps are as follows.
(1) Establishing a hierarchical structure model of AHP, as shown in Figure 3 .
The hierarchical structure of AHP is composed of three layers:
• Target layer (top layer): the intended target of the problem.
• Criterion layer (middle layer): the criteria that affecting the achievement of the target.
• Measure layer (lowest layer): the measures that promoting the achievement of the target. Aiming at the problem of selecting users on the sensing platform, this paper takes the optimal user set selection as the target layer element, the three attributes of the sensing user's participation threshold, cost and reputation value as the criterion layer elements, and m users as the measure layer elements. The hierarchical structure diagram indicates that a set of links from the measure layer to the target layer represent a certain attribute information of a sensing user, which serves as an influence attribute for selecting the optimal user set.
(2) Construction of judgment matrix Based on the hierarchical structure diagram shown in Figure 3 , a corresponding judgment matrix can be constructed. MAIM adopts the 1-9 scale method proposed by Saaty [21] , and uses the ratio of importance between two elements to indicate the relative importance level of the two elements. Table 2 , (ii)a uv > 0, (iii)a uu = 1, then it is considered to be a consistency matrix. According to the above construction method, judgment matrix A is obtained as follows. Hierarchical single sorting refers to the process of determining the influence degree of each element of the lower layer on an element of the upper layer. The weight vector represents the influence degree and is calculated using the sum method. For the consistency judgment matrix, each column is normalized to serve as the corresponding weight, and for the non-consistency judgment matrix, each column is normalized to approximate its corresponding weight. The arithmetic mean value then serves as the final weight for the n column vectors. This calculation is shown in formula (4).
The normalized weight vector ω u = (ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω n ) T of the judgment matrix A is obtained using the sum method, and the maximum eigenvalue λ of A is obtained according to the calculation shown in the formula (5) .
The judgment matrix obtained from the pairwise comparison results may present inconsistency in some cases, therefore, the consistency test of the judgment matrix is necessary. The consistency test steps are as follows:
• Calculating the consistency indicator CI as shown in formula (6) .
• Calculating the random consistency indicator RI : MAIM randomly constructs 500 judgment matrices A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A 500 , then the consistency indicators CI 1 , CI 2 , . . . , CI 500 can be obtained. According to the calculation shown in formula (7), the random consistency indicator RI is obtained. − n n − 1 (7)
• Calculating the hierarchical single sorting consistency ratio CR 1 as shown in formula (8) . When CR 1 is less than 0.1, it is generally considered that the consistency of the judgment matrix A is acceptable, otherwise A needs to be reconstructed.
(4) Hierarchical total sorting and consistency test The hierarchical total sorting refers to the weight sorting process of determining the relative importance of all elements in a certain layer to the target layer. Suppose that the weights of the three elements X 1 , X 2 , X 3 of the criterion layer X to VOLUME 6, 2018 the target layer Z are x 1 , x 2 , x 3 respectively, and the weights of the m elements of the measure layer Y to the element X j in the criterion layer X are y 1j , y 2j , . . . , y mj (j = 1, 2, 3) respectively. Then the sorting weight of the ith element of the measure layer Y to the target layer Z is 3 j=1 x j y ij . Table 4 gives the sorted weights of the elements of the criterion layer X and the measure layer Y for the relative importance of the target layer Z . Upon calculating the total sorting results of measure layer Y , it is necessary to perform the hierarchical total sorting consistency test to obtain the hierarchical total sorting consistency ratio CR 2 through formula (9).
When CR 2 is less than 0.1, the hierarchical total sorting is considered passing the consistency test. At this point, the platform can make the final decision based on the overall sorting results of the measure layer. The overall goal of the sensing platform is to select the optimal user set. Assuming that the size of the optimal user set is l, the sensing platform can select l (l ≤ m) users with greater weight according to the sorting results in the measure layer to constitute an optimal user set.
4) USER PARTICIPATION INTENTION ANALYSIS
One of the goals of MAIM is to realize the two-way selection between the sensing platform and the sensing users. Therefore, after receiving the user selection result fed back by the sensing platform P, sensing users can independently decide whether to finally accept the processing request of subtask k. MAIM provides a reward calculation function and a participation intention analysis function for the sensing users, who can perform the user participation intention analysis according to the cost of processing subtask k and the reward paid by the sensing platform P for completing subtask k.
(1) Reward calculation function In order to encourage more sensing users to participate in the sensing task, the sensing platform P gives each sensing user who completes the subtask a reward. The MAIM uses L K = f (M (t), µ k , E(t)) represents the reward calculation function, and it is shown in formula (10) [24] , where γ is the adjustment factor.
Through the reward calculation method, P initially provides higher payment to reward sensing users for participating in the task processing, thereby improves participation rate. With the increase of the number of sensing users, the number of subtasks continues to increase until it stabilizes, the surplus of the total budget gradually decreases, and the rewards provided by the sensing platform tend to stabilize, thereby greatly reducing the cost of the platform.
(2) Participation intention analysis function Sensing users performs the intention analysis according to the cost C i of processing the subtask k and the reward L k paid by the sensing platform P for the user to complete the subtask k, and then decide whether to accept the processing request of the subtask k. MAIM uses
as the participation intention analysis function, with the calculation result being either 1 or 0, where 1 is accepted and 0 is rejected as shown in formula(11) [24] .
MAIM compares the ratio of the reward L k paid by the platform P for completing the subtask k and the cost C i required for the sensing user to process the subtask k to the participation threshold thresh i of the sensing user. If the ratio is greater than the participation threshold thresh i , the sensing user accepts the processing request of the subtask k, otherwise, the sensing user rejects the request.
5) REPUTATION SCORE REWARD AND PUNISHMENT MECHANISM
In order to improve user participation and data quality, MAIM sets the reputation score reward and punishment mechanism. The sensing platform updates the reputation score of the sensing user according to the sensing platform's satisfaction with the task processing results uploaded by the sensing user and the existent state of the sensing user. Then the sensing platform takes measures to reward active performers and punish malicious vandals. The reputation score is an important factor for user selection. High reputation score indicates that the sensing user performs well in task processing, giving the user an advantage in the next user selection phase. For users in different existent states, MAIM divides the update methods of reputation score into the following three situations:
• New users: in order to encourage more users to participate in the sensing process, 0.1 additional reward score is awarded to each new sensing user: q+0.1, where q is the initial reputation score set for each user by the sensing platform.
• Existing users: for sensing users who already exist in the system, the update method of reputation score is shown in formula (12) .
Specifically, R represents the evaluation made by the sensing platform on sensing user task completion. The evaluation has two levels: S indicates that the sensing user task completion condition succeeded to meet the requirement, and F denotes that the sensing user task completion condition failed to meet the requirement. After the sensing platform gives an evaluation based on the data uploaded by the sensing user, the reputation score of the sensing user can be calculated and updated. When the sensing user accepts a task processing request and receives a positive evaluation, the added value of the reputation score is the utility value of the completed subtask. On the other hand, if the sensing user receives a negative evaluation, the reputation score will be reduced by half of the value of the completed subtask. When the sensing user's reputation score is reduced to q with an additional negative evaluation, the sensing user's reputation score will then be cleared, and the sensing user will be marked by the sensing platform and enter the penalty period. In particular, sensing users who enter the penalty period can only increase reputation score by 0.3q upon positive performance and evaluation. In other words, sensing users in the penalty period must at least perfectly perform tasks 3 times before clearance, and the sensing user will not be paid during this time. Consequently, sensing users in the penalty period will remain blocked by the sensing platform without performing actively and positively. In addition, in order to prevent frequent attacks by malicious users, the sensing platform keeps the counts of blocks of each sensing user. With a block count greater than 3, the sensing user will be permanently blacklisted and removed from the user list maintained by the sensing platform.
• Users who quit: in order to encourage participation over extended periods of time, the reputation score accumulated in the history of any unmarked sensing user who quitted randomly will be cleared.
IV. FEASIBILITY VERIFICATION AND SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
In this section, we present two different simulations. One is feasibility verification, verifying that AHP method is feasible in user selection, and the other shows the simulation effect of MAIM's incentive mechanism.
A. FEASIBILITY VERIFICATION
In order to verify the feasibility of AHP in selecting the optimal user set on the sensing platform, a simulation was conducted in the environment of MATLAB R2016a. Assuming that the number of sensing users in the measure layer is 5, this paper uses the random data generated by the random function and combines with formulas (1), (2) and (3) to calculate the user attribute information of the 5 different sensing users. User attributes are shown in Table 5 . (1) Calculating the weight vector of the criterion layer to the target layer. The average values of the three attributes of participation threshold, cost and reputation value uploaded by the 5 users in the criterion layer are taken as a data set respectively. According to the ratio of each attribute value to its total value, the importance level of the three attributes is set by the 1-9 scale rule, as shown in Table 6 . According to the comparison result of the two attributes, the judgment matrix A of the criterion layer to the target layer is constructed as follows. T of the judgment matrix A, we can obtain the result λ = 3.001, ω = (0.131, 0.652, 0.217)
T . In order to verify the consistency of A, it is necessary to perform the consistency test. The consistency indicator CI of judgement matrix A can be calculated.
Then according to formula (8), we can obtain the calculation result of the hierarchical single sorting consistency ratio CR 1 as follows, where RI = 0.58 is shown in Table 3 .
The result proves that the consistency of the judgment matrix A is acceptable, that is, the weight vector ω = (0.131, 0.652, 0.217) T of the element X j (j = 1, 2, 3) in the criterion layer to the target layer Z has passed the consistency test. 
Therefore, we can calculate the maximum eigenvalues, corresponding weight vectors, and consistency test results of each judgment matrix, as shown in Table 7 . By calculating the consistency ratio CR j , we can find that judgement matrixs X 1 , X 2 , X 3 all pass the consistency test. Thereby, we can obtain the weight vector (0.441, 0.131, 0.141, 0.180, 0.108)
T of the measure layer Y to the target layer Z , namely the hierarchical total sorting result of the measure layer Y . Assuming that the optimal user set size is 3, according to the sorting weights of the five users, the final decision made by the sensing platform is Y 1 preferred, Y 4 second, and Y 3 last. (3) In order to verify whether the hierarchical total sorting result of the measure layer Y can be used as the final decision basis, it requires the consistency test of the hierarchical total sorting. Therefore, it is necessary to calculate the hierarchical total sorting consistency ratio CR 2 . The result indicates that the hierarchical total sorting succeeds to pass the consistency test, so the final decision of the platform is Y 1 preferred, Y 4 second, and Y 3 last.
In summary, the above experimental results verify the feasibility of AHP in selecting the optimal user set on the sensing platform. In other words, the sensing platform can use the AHP and combine the qualitative with quantitative methods to evaluate the three attributes of participation threshold, cost and reputation value, so as to obtain the user's sorting weight and then determine the optimal user set.
B. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
The simulation is conducted in MATLAB R2016a, running on Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6200U CPU@2.30GHz processor and 8G memory on Windows 7. All simulation results are averaged from multiple runs with the same configuration and all simulations last for 50 time units t. In order to objectively test and evaluate the effect of the proposed incentive mechanism, we compare MAIM's incentive mechanism with user participation incentive mechanism PAIP [25] and user participation incentive mechanism based on reputation model for crowdsensing network CPAIP [24] under the same environment settings. Simulation results on the task completion ratio and the budget surplus ratio will be analyzed. Specific simulation parameter settings are shown in Table 8 . The task completion ratio refers to the ratio of the number of completed tasks to the total number of tasks within a specified time. The results of the task completion ratio of different comparison groups in different time t(s) are shown in Figure 4 . As time t increases, the task completion ratios of the three incentive mechanisms all improved significantly. Figure 5 shows that with an increased total platform budget, the task completion ratios of the three incentives have all further improved. Compared with that of PAIP, CPAIP's task completion ratio achieved greater improvement, while MAIM performed the best among the three. With an increased number of users, the task completion ratios of the three incentive mechanisms had ignorable changes, due to the total platform budget constraints, as shown in Figure 6 . Figure 7 indicates that the increased number of subtasks imposes an observable impact on PAIP, but not on CPAIP or MAIM. Figure 8 shows an increased task completion ratios of all three incentive mechanisms when the total platform budget, the number of subtasks, and the number of users are simultaneously increased. Specifically, MAIM is more advantageous by having a 12% edge over PAIP and a 6% edge over CPAIP within the specified time period in terms of the average increase of task completion ratio. The rationale behind this lies on the fact that the optimal user selection plays a key influencing factor to improve subtask completion ratio when all three parameters are increased. The optimal user takes advantage of the efficiency of subtask processing so as to shorten the overall task completion time and improve the task completion ratio. Compared with PAIP, CPAIP achieves a better task completion ratio and higher user participation thanks to its user reputation evaluation and selection mechanism by taking turn assigning subtasks to users with high reputation. MAIM not only considers the user's reputation, but also takes account of the user participation threshold and cost as attributes in user selection. This multi-attribute user selection mechanism picks participants with better processing ability, thereby improving the task completion ratio and giving MAIM an advantage over the other two approaches.
The budget surplus ratio refers to the ratio of the remaining budget to the total budget of the sensing platform, where the remaining budget refers to the total budget of the sensing platform less the total compensation paid to the users. The simulation results of the budget surplus ratio of different comparison groups in different time t(s) are shown in Figure 9 . As time t increases, the budget surplus ratios of the three incentive mechanisms decrease to a tendency to stabilize. Figure 10 shows that the budget surplus ratios of the three incentives mechanisms remained similar with increased total budget of the sensing platform. Figure 11 indicates that the budget surplus ratios of the three incentives mechanisms declined with increased number of users. Figure 12 shows that the budget surplus ratios of the three incentive mechanisms increased with increased number of subtasks. MAIM achieved the greatest increase, followed by CPAIP then PAIP. Figure 13 shows that CPAIP and MAIM have noticeably improved budget surplus ratio with increased total budget of sensing platform, number of subtasks and number of users simultaneously. MAIM achieved greater improvement than CPAIP. Specifically, based on the calculation of the average increase of the budget surplus ratio within the specified time, MAIM is 8% more superior than PAIP and 5% than CPAIP. This is due to the effectiveness of the user selection leading to an increase in the task completion ratio and the budget surplus ratio. Thanks to its advanced optimization in user selection, MAIM has an advantage over the other two approaches. 
V. RELATED WORKS
The purpose of the incentive mechanism is to encourage sensing users to participate in the sensing tasks. Different applications and practical problems demands diverse design of incentive mechanism. In non-money incentives, entertainment game incentive introduces the game strategy into mobile crowdsensing systems, and fully utilizes the entertainment and attraction of games to motivate users for completing sensing tasks. Barkhuus et al. [15] designed an outdoor game for plotting an area WiFi coverage map. The rules of the game are for players carrying GPS and WiFi mobile devices [26] to pick up virtual coins scattered across the game area and upload the coins to the server in exchange of game points. With the movements of the players, the server can use the trajectory data to update the WiFi coverage map of the area. While user participation can be motivated by the fun of the game and the rewards of game points, not all sensing tasks can be easily gamified. Therefore, the incentive mechanisms based on entertainment games have limitations depending on the application scenarios. In comparison, reputation score incentive rewards users with increased reputation, which allows users to obtain reputation satisfaction from them and actively participate in sensing tasks. Yu et al. [17] proposed a data traffic sharing system INDAPSON, which encourages users with excessive traffic data to share traffic with users having insufficient traffic through the reputation score system. A user with excessive traffic can share traffic through the INDAPSON system and receive credit in reputation. Users with insufficient traffic on the other hand can use reputation in exchange for traffic. Since reputation score incentives only provide users with psychological needs of reputation, the enthusiasm of users participation may not be significantly stimulated.
Compared with non-money incentives, money-based incentives tend to substantially stimulate the interest of users. Money-based incentives not only apply to a wide range of scenarios but also greatly enhance the user's sense of acquisition. It is worth noting that in both platform-centered and user-centered incentive mechanisms, the problem of user selection has always been the focus of the platform. In the platform-centered incentive mechanism, the platform pays users according to factors such as the user's sensing time, the value of the task, and the quality of the data. Han et al. [27] studied the incentive mechanism of mobile crowdsensing networks: the platform publishes sensing tasks, followed by sensing users competing for tasks according to their sensing cost and time, and finally the sensing platform pays sensing rewards to users under budget constraints. While the platform can maximize its utility under the condition of controllable budget, data quality still cannot be guaranteed and the problem of user selection remains unsolved. Angelopoulos et al. [25] studied different incentive mechanisms and applied them in the calculation of rewards according to different types of tasks. User participation incentive mechanism strategy PAIP (participation aware incentive policy) selects sensing users in a random manner. Due to the lack of consideration of the user's own characteristics, user participation and data quality are below satisfaction, thereby reducing the task completion ratio and increasing platform consumption costs as a whole. Zhang et al. [24] proposed a crowdsensing network user participation incentive mechanism CPAIP (credit participation aware incentive policy) based on reputation model which initially assigns different reputation values to users. When the platform publishes sensing tasks and users participate in tasks competition, the platform selects users according to their reputation values. The platform preferentially selects users with high reputation values to participate in task processing, and adjusts the user's cost through the factors α and β. Finally, the platform pays the user based on the reward calculation function, and updates the user's reputation value for future uses. The user selection scheme based on reputation value proposed in the literature still falls short in two aspects: reputation updates need to be further considered, and the user selection method based on single attribute reputation value might be biased or incomprehensive.
The above incentive mechanisms can produce corresponding incentive effects to a certain extent, but limitations and deficiencies still exist as discussed as follows. Non-money incentives have limitations of application scenarios and the virtuality of reward methods. Money-based incentives mostly adopt a single attribute or a random user selection method, resulting in declined enthusiasm of user participation, decreased rate of task completion, and increased cost of platform consumption. To tackle the above problems, this research proposes a novel incentive mechanism MAIM, a hybrid incentive mechanism bridging non-money incentive and money-based incentive approaches. It not only satisfies the psychological requirements of user reputation, but also enhances users' sense of acquisition and participation enthusiasm through reward payments. Specifically, in the user selection phase, MAIM's incentive mechanism performs multi-attribute user selection based on three attributes uploaded by sensing users and employs AHP to optimize selected user set. Compared with PAIP and CPAIP, MAIM significantly improves the task completion ratio and the budget surplus ratio.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In view of the fact that most incentive mechanisms adopt single attribute selection or random selection, which leads to a problem that the task completion ratio decreases and the platform consumption cost increases, this paper proposed an incentive mechanism MAIM based on multi-attribute user selection and participation intention analysis. On one hand, the sensing platform publishes task request messages to sensing users and performs multi-attribute user selection using AHP. On the other hand, sensing users can decide whether to accept the task processing request through participation intention analysis. This mechanism not only implements the two-way selection between the sensing platform and sensing users, but also effectively improves sensing user quality through a rational reputation, reward and punishment mechanism. Compared with two existing representative incentive mechanisms, MAIM performs 12% better than PAIP and 6% better than CPAIP in terms of task completion ratio, and 8% better than PAIP and 5% better than CPAIP in budget surplus ratio. Future research will include further improving the computational efficiency of optimal user selection, evaluation of user selection criteria, and further improving data quality and reducing the platform consumption.
